Death And Nonexistence – Palle Yourgrau

But he also says that ‘what separates actual, living people from merely possible people is precisely their existence,’ which seems to imply that merely possible people do not exist.” Let me try to unmix what’s being mixed up in this cri- tique. In Luper’s first sentence, he refers to those “concretists,” including myself, who deny that possibilia exist in other worlds.

Since the very idea of possibilia, i.e. merely possible objects, is that of objects that exist in other worlds, it’s a mys- tery why he attributes that denial to me. The mystery is im- mediately resolved, however, when in his final sentence he correctly attributes to me, in light of the quotation he’s just made from my paper, the view that merely possible people don’t exist. The solution is simple. Merely possible people, I’m saying, who are “a perfectly ordinary kind of concrete object,” don’t exist—​i.e. don’t actually exist; they merely pos- sibly exist, which is to say, they exist only in other possible worlds.

What seems to have thrown Luper off is something I suggested earlier, a tendency to conflate concreteness with actuality or existence. Hence Luper’s belief that there’s a ten- sion between my assertion that possible people are a perfectly ordinary kind of concrete object and my view that possible people aren’t actual—​don’t actually exist. Luper’s objection indicates how easy it is to misconstrue the distinction between what you are and whether you are.

Kit Fine, fortunately, in “Necessity and Non-​existence,”10 has done much to clarify the situation by invoking a distinction between what he calls worldly vs transcendental properties. 10. In Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers (Fine 2005). T h e C l o u d o r t h e R a i n d r o p s ? | 9 1 A worldly property is one determined by what happens in a possible world, and “a possible world, in the sense of how things turn out, will .

. . be constituted by what exists [in it] . . .

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2019 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress ISBN 978–​0–​19–​024747–​8 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America For Mary CONTENTS Preface ix I The Paradox of Nonexistence 1 II The Predicate of Existence 14 III Nonexistence and Death 38 IV The Cloud or the Raindrops?

73 V Where You Go When You’re Dead 95 VI Taking Possible Worlds Seriously 106 VII Time and Existence 127 VIII Fellow Travelers 150 IX Beyond Metaphysics 173 Bibliography 195 Index 207 PREFACE Buffalo Bill ’s defunct who used to ride a watersmooth-​silver stallion and break one two three four five pigeons just like that Jesus he was a handsome man and what i want to know is how do you like your blueeyed boy Mister Death —​e .e . c um m i ng s 1 The philosophy of death, now a domain of active research in analytical philosophy, originated in recent years with 1.

In his commentary on the poem, Thomas Dilworth (1995) writes that “the speaker assumes it is better to be alive than dead. So death, which cancelled Buffalo Bill’s skill and erased his good looks, gives the speaker an advantage over him. . . .

This is a short excerpt from the opening of “” by Unknown, quoted for review and introduction purposes. All rights belong to the copyright holders.

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