{"id":252821,"date":"2026-07-13T02:23:51","date_gmt":"2026-07-12T23:23:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/1kitap1.com\/en\/a-forever-war-colin-shindler-1\/"},"modified":"2026-07-13T02:23:51","modified_gmt":"2026-07-12T23:23:51","slug":"a-forever-war-colin-shindler-1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/1kitap1.com\/en\/a-forever-war-colin-shindler-1\/","title":{"rendered":"A Forever War – Colin Shindler (1)"},"content":{"rendered":"
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He then proposed direct talks between Israelis and Palestinians. In 1988, Faisal Husseini published his outline of a Declaration of Palestinian Independence on the basis of the two-state UN Resolution 181 of 1947. He further argued that any provisional government should include the rejectionist PFLP and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). All this coincided with King Hussein\u2019s decision to wash Jordan\u2019s hands of responsibility for the West Bank.<\/p>\n

Such manifestations of rapprochement were welcomed by Peres and the Labour Party but infuriated the Likud, which denounced them. A conference of the Palestinian National Convention in Algiers the same year condemned \u2018all forms of terrorism\u2019 but maintained the right to carry out \u2018the armed struggle against the Zionist entity\u2019. 4 When the Palestinian Declaration of Independence was read out, there was no mention of Israel. While Arafat promoted \u2018the peace of the brave\u2019, he also upheld UN Resolution 194, which stipulated that all Palestinian refugees had \u2018the right to return\u2019 to Palestine \u2013 a red line for Israelis of all political hues.<\/p>\n

5 All this enhanced Arafat\u2019s reputation for ambiguity and unreliability. The US insisted on clarity from Arafat before they would conduct a dialogue with the PLO. He begrudgingly and publicly voiced the words that the Americans had given him, and the US\u2013PLO dialogue started immediately. Dozens of countries, mainly from the Soviet bloc and the Global South, recognised Palestine as a sovereign state. In Israel, 54 per cent of citizens were willing to enter into talks with the PLO. 6 Shamir\u2019s aim, however, was to undermine any PLO dialogue with the Americans \u2013 an aim shared by both Israeli and Palestinian maximalists.<\/p>\n

Arafat\u2019s mainstream Fatah group subsequently refrained from any cross-border raids, but the rejectionist groups who were also represented on the PLO Executive did not have any such reservations. This disjunct was exploited by the Likud and the Right in general in Israel. In May 1990, after an attack on Israel\u2019s popular Nitzanim beach by the PLF, Arafat repeatedly refused to dismiss the group from the PLO Executive.<\/p>\n

This ended the short- lived dialogue between the US and the PLO. Despite this, a joint delegation of Jordanians and Palestinians \u2013 excluding inhabitants of East Jerusalem \u2013 attended the 1991 Madrid Conference with the quiet blessing of Arafat. The local Palestinian leadership, Husseini, Hanan Ashrawi and Sari Nusseibeh, took an independent line but also reported the results of their discussions to the PLO in Tunis.<\/p>\n

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The right of Colin Shindler to be identified as the Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library We make every effort to make sure our products are safe for the purpose for which they are intended.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This is a short excerpt from the opening of “” by Unknown, quoted for review and introduction purposes. All rights belong to the copyright holders.<\/em><\/p>\n

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