{"id":256852,"date":"2026-07-13T15:06:08","date_gmt":"2026-07-13T12:06:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/1kitap1.com\/en\/concorde-and-the-americans-kenneth-owen\/"},"modified":"2026-07-13T15:06:08","modified_gmt":"2026-07-13T12:06:08","slug":"concorde-and-the-americans-kenneth-owen","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/1kitap1.com\/en\/concorde-and-the-americans-kenneth-owen\/","title":{"rendered":"Concorde And The Americans – Kenneth Owen"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Air France flew between Paris and Rio de Janeiro via Dakar, while British Airways flew from London to Bahrain, first leg of the planned route to Australia. But for the future, the transatlantic routes were crucial. To fly or not to fly into the lucrative United States market would alone determine whether the supersonic dream would take shape, take root, and survive.<\/p>\n

The approach of supersonic airline services to the United States was to prove a turbulent passage through unfriendly skies, at least as perceived by the British and French. Normally, for subsonic aircraft, the process is straightforward: existing in- ternational agreements include the mutual acceptance of national airworthiness and licensing standards, and reciprocal agreement on routes. These international agreements are subject to relevant national regulations, applied fairly and without discrimination. Hence U.S. approval was required for British Airways and Air France to begin scheduled services by Concorde to that country, and in a com- pletely separate process, a U.S.<\/p>\n

certificate of airworthiness was required before any American airline could operate the aircraft. These customary aviation procedures were soon engulfed in a wider storm, however, as political and environmental arguments, set in the fragile framework of international relations, clouded the normally straightforward resolution of tech- nical issues. The Concorde approval process involved not only aviation authorities but also presidents and the public. The key issue would prove to be the environ- mental impact of the aircraft and, above all, the noise of its engines.<\/p>\n

Concorde and the Americans British Aircraft Corporation\u2019s American subsidiary had taken a first look at the problems of combating the potential opposition to the Concorde in the United States in an internal report in September 1972.’ Anti-SST feeling in the country was still strong, the report warned. The company should maintain a low profile for the next 18 months\u2014\u201cTime is the great healer\u201d \u2014and then gradually increase the publicity effort in order to create favorable opinions of the aircraft \u201cwithin all seg- ments of the United States that could affect its sales prospects.\u201d<\/p>\n

As it turned out, America\u2019s SST wounds were far from healed with the passage of time, and the modest, orderly publicity campaign proposed was soon overtaken by an all-out Anglo-French effort, intended not to enhance sales prospects but simply to ensure survival.<\/p>\n

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he Concorde entered airline service in 1976 and remains today a technological triumph, flying daily between New York and Europe at twice the speed of sound. But the life of this supersonic transport (SST) has been beset by bitter political controversies over its environmen- tal and economic effects, and by strained diplo- matic relations between the United States, France, and Britain.<\/p>\n

Drawing on recently released documents from business and government archives on both sides of the Atlantic, Kenneth Owen recounts for the first tume the dramatic transatlantic negotiations that accompanied the rise and fall of the planned American SST, the unprecedented Anglo-French collaboration in building the Concorde, and the bitter battle for approval of Concorde service to the United States.<\/p>\n

He discloses that Britain turned to France as a partner in its SST program only after the U.S. government declined to par- ticipate. He also exposes the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in monitoring the Concorde\u2019s progress, and cites high-ievel American attempts to persuade British ministers to abandon the project. The book also describes the crucial fight for approval of regular Concorde flights to New York and Washington, D.C., airports, with both national and local groups fighting hard to ban the plane over issues of noise and emissions standards.<\/p>\n

Outlining the economic obstacles that more than twenty years of Concorde service have failed to overcome, Owen argues that develop- ment of the Concorde rested on twin fallacies of ee LOCATION HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY Acc DATE iin HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY \u2014 *. \u2018eA pee (eG Sa Oe ee) BY AUTHORITY | LUNE AND THE MERICHND LUNE ND Unt AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT Airlife England \u00a9 1997 by Kenneth Owen Published in association with the Science Museum, London First published in the UK in 1997 by Airlife Publishing Ltd.<\/p>\n

First published in the United States by Smithsonian Institution Press British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 1 85310 959 2 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and re- trieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing.<\/p>\n

Printed in the United States of America Airlife Publishing Ltd. tor Longden Road, Shrewsbury SY3 9EB, England To Suzette Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2024 https:\/\/archive.org\/details\/concordeamerican0000kenn CONTENTS Preface six Acknowledgments xiii Abbreviations xv 1. Quest for Speed 1 PART ONE: ORIGINS 2. Could We, Should We, Go It Alone?<\/p>\n

15 3. Seriously Seeking a Partner: The Quest Continues 27 PART TWO: IMPACTS 4. The Race Begins 41 5.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This is a short excerpt from the opening of “” by Unknown, quoted for review and introduction purposes. All rights belong to the copyright holders.<\/em><\/p>\n

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