{"id":258110,"date":"2026-07-13T16:04:02","date_gmt":"2026-07-13T13:04:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/1kitap1.com\/en\/death-and-nonexistence-palle-yourgrau\/"},"modified":"2026-07-13T16:04:02","modified_gmt":"2026-07-13T13:04:02","slug":"death-and-nonexistence-palle-yourgrau","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/1kitap1.com\/en\/death-and-nonexistence-palle-yourgrau\/","title":{"rendered":"Death And Nonexistence – Palle Yourgrau"},"content":{"rendered":"
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But he also says that \u2018what separates actual, living people from merely possible people is precisely their existence,\u2019 which seems to imply that merely possible people do not exist.\u201d Let me try to unmix what\u2019s being mixed up in this cri- tique. In Luper\u2019s first sentence, he refers to those \u201cconcretists,\u201d including myself, who deny that possibilia exist in other worlds.<\/p>\n

Since the very idea of possibilia, i.e. merely possible objects, is that of objects that exist in other worlds, it\u2019s a mys- tery why he attributes that denial to me. The mystery is im- mediately resolved, however, when in his final sentence he correctly attributes to me, in light of the quotation he\u2019s just made from my paper, the view that merely possible people don\u2019t exist. The solution is simple. Merely possible people, I\u2019m saying, who are \u201ca perfectly ordinary kind of concrete object,\u201d don\u2019t exist\u2014\u200bi.e. don\u2019t actually exist; they merely pos- sibly exist, which is to say, they exist only in other possible worlds.<\/p>\n

What seems to have thrown Luper off is something I suggested earlier, a tendency to conflate concreteness with actuality or existence. Hence Luper\u2019s belief that there\u2019s a ten- sion between my assertion that possible people are a perfectly ordinary kind of concrete object and my view that possible people aren\u2019t actual\u2014\u200bdon\u2019t actually exist. Luper\u2019s objection indicates how easy it is to misconstrue the distinction between what you are and whether you are.<\/p>\n

Kit Fine, fortunately, in \u201cNecessity and Non-\u200bexistence,\u201d10 has done much to clarify the situation by invoking a distinction between what he calls worldly vs transcendental properties. 10. In Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers (Fine 2005). T h e C l o u d o r t h e R a i n d r o p s ? | 9 1 A worldly property is one determined by what happens in a possible world, and \u201ca possible world, in the sense of how things turn out, will .<\/p>\n

. . be constituted by what exists [in it] . . .<\/p>\n

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Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University\u2019s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.<\/p>\n

\u00a9 Oxford University Press 2019 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.<\/p>\n

You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress ISBN 978\u2013\u200b0\u2013\u200b19\u2013\u200b024747\u2013\u200b8 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America For Mary CONTENTS Preface ix I The Paradox of Nonexistence 1 II The Predicate of Existence 14 III Nonexistence and Death 38 IV The Cloud or the Raindrops?<\/p>\n

73 V Where You Go When You\u2019re Dead 95 VI Taking Possible Worlds Seriously 106 VII Time and Existence 127 VIII Fellow Travelers 150 IX Beyond Metaphysics 173 Bibliography 195 Index 207 PREFACE Buffalo Bill \u2019s defunct who used to ride a watersmooth-\u200bsilver stallion and break one two three four five pigeons just like that Jesus he was a handsome man and what i want to know is how do you like your blueeyed boy Mister Death \u2014\u200be .e . c um m i ng s 1 The philosophy of death, now a domain of active research in analytical philosophy, originated in recent years with 1.<\/p>\n

In his commentary on the poem, Thomas Dilworth (1995) writes that \u201cthe speaker assumes it is better to be alive than dead. So death, which cancelled Buffalo Bill\u2019s skill and erased his good looks, gives the speaker an advantage over him. . . .<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This is a short excerpt from the opening of “” by Unknown, quoted for review and introduction purposes. All rights belong to the copyright holders.<\/em><\/p>\n

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