{"id":263274,"date":"2026-07-14T14:28:09","date_gmt":"2026-07-14T11:28:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/1kitap1.com\/en\/how-things-are-an-introduction-to-buddhist-metaphysics-mark-siderits\/"},"modified":"2026-07-14T14:28:09","modified_gmt":"2026-07-14T11:28:09","slug":"how-things-are-an-introduction-to-buddhist-metaphysics-mark-siderits","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/1kitap1.com\/en\/how-things-are-an-introduction-to-buddhist-metaphysics-mark-siderits\/","title":{"rendered":"How Things Are An Introduction To Buddhist Metaphysics – Mark Siderits"},"content":{"rendered":"
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(For Ny\u0101ya, qualitatively identical tropes are individuated by the substances in which they inhere.) But if there are no universals, then there can be no qualitative identity among tropes, so inherence and individuators are eliminable. Each dharma is a unique momentary particular. This last claim, that the ultimate reals are just momentary trope occurrences, is one that comes at the end of a series of developments in Abhidharma thought.<\/p>\n

While Abhidharma was always officially nominalist, in its earlier phases its nominalism was of the \u201costrich\u201d sort: while denying that there are universals, it failed to grapple with the difficulty posed by the realist\u2019s One Over Many argument.2 It is only with Dign\u0101ga and Dharmak\u012brti that Buddhist metaphysics confronts the demands of a radical nominalist on- tology, one containing no more than unique momentary trope occurrences.<\/p>\n

This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the head-\u200bin-\u200bthe-\u200bsand variety of nominalism to be found in classical Abhidharma. The difficulties that de- velop out of its accounts motivate the more radical nominalism developed by Dharmak\u012brti. His version is built around the banner of apoha or exclu- sion. The basic claim of the apoha theory is that kind-\u200bterms like \u201ccow\u201d de- note cows by virtue of their denoting all those things that are not in the class of non-\u200bcows.<\/p>\n

What all members of the class of cows have in common is not cowness but their not being non-\u200bcows. This makes the apoha theory a theory of semantics (as well as a theory of concept formation), and not primarily a metaphysical theory. But insofar as the principal challenge to a pure nomi- nalist ontology comes from its seeming inability to account for language use and concept formation, our discussion of this part of Buddhist metaphysics will have to stray into the domains of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind.<\/p>\n

6.1 Ostrich Nominalism?<\/p>\n

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Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University\u2019s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. \u00a9 Oxford University Press 2022 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization.<\/p>\n

Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. Library of Congress Cataloging-\u200bin-\u200bPublication Data Names: Siderits, Mark, 1946\u2013 author. Title: How things are : an introduction to Buddhist metaphysics \/ Mark Siderits. Description: New York, NY, United States of America : Oxford University Press, 2022. | Series: Buddhist philosophy for philosophers | Includes bibliographical references and index.<\/p>\n

Identifiers: LCCN 2021030120 (print) | LCCN 2021030121 (ebook) | ISBN 9780197606919 (paperback) | ISBN 9780197606902 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197606933 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Buddhist philosophy. | Buddhism\u2014Relations\u2014Hinduism. | Hinduism\u2014Relations\u2014Buddhism. | Philosophy\u2014Comparative. | Vasubandhu. | Dharmaki\u0304rti, active 7th century. | Na\u0304ga\u0304rjuna, active 2nd century. Classification: LCC B162 .S533 2021 (print) | LCC B162 (ebook) | DDC 181\/.043\u2014dc23 LC record available at https:\/\/lccn.loc.gov\/2021030120 LC ebook record available at https:\/\/lccn.loc.gov\/2021030121 DOI: 10.1093\/\u200boso\/\u200b9780197606902.001.0001 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Paperback printed by LSC Communications, United States of America Hardback printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America Contents 1.<\/p>\n

\u0007Introduction: The Buddhist Metaphysical Landscape \b 1 2. \u0007Non-\u200bSelf I \b 18 3. \u0007Non-\u200bSelf II \b 29 4. \u0007Fundamental Ontology \b 47 5. \u0007Causation \b 72 6. \u0007Buddhist Nominalism \b 93 7. \u0007Time \b 110 8. \u0007The External World \b 127 9. \u0007The Internal World \b 147 10. \u0007Anti-\u200bRealisms Local and Global \b 171 Abbreviations \b 193 References \b 197 Index \b 201 How Things Are.<\/p>\n

Mark Siderits, Oxford University Press. \u00a9 Oxford University Press 2022.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This is a short excerpt from the opening of “” by Unknown, quoted for review and introduction purposes. All rights belong to the copyright holders.<\/em><\/p>\n

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