{"id":263811,"date":"2026-07-15T01:40:29","date_gmt":"2026-07-14T22:40:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/1kitap1.com\/en\/india-today-16-march-2026-india-today\/"},"modified":"2026-07-15T01:40:29","modified_gmt":"2026-07-14T22:40:29","slug":"india-today-16-march-2026-india-today","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/1kitap1.com\/en\/india-today-16-march-2026-india-today\/","title":{"rendered":"India Today – 16 March 2026 – India Today"},"content":{"rendered":"
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he decision by Trump and Israeli prime minister Benja- min Netanyahu to strike Iran did not have a single trig- ger. Rather, it appeared to emerge from a converge nce of political opportunity, intelligence signals and shifting stra- tegic calculations. The backdrop to the escalation had been set just eight months earlier, in June 2025, when Israel launched its \ufb01ercest attack yet on Iran, claiming that Tehran was only months away from developing a nuclear weapon.<\/p>\n

Both sides ex- changed barrages of missiles and drones before Trump autho- rised Operation Midnight Hammer. Dropping bunker-buster bombs on three of Iran\u2019s key nuclear facilities, the US president claimed the strikes had \u201ctotally obliterated\u201d Iran\u2019s nuclear ambi- tions. In retaliation, Iran targeted America\u2019s Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar with the same number of missiles as US had used to strike its nuclear sites. Claiming that Washington\u2019s objectives Research Scholar, Al- Mustafa International University, Qom, Iran Former international civil servant who was posted in Iran Former Indian Ambassador to Iran \u201cHigh risk of turning into a war of attrition\u201d \u201cWill end in a re- sounding US defeat\u201d \u201cFour scenarios could bring the war to an end\u201d here are four scenarios that could bring this war to a closure.<\/p>\n

The \ufb01rst is military, wherein Iran runs short of missiles or su\ufb00ers a catastrophic failure in its command-and-control sys- tem leading to internal politi- cal change. For now, however, the regime is holding, and even con- solidating, its position. Two, Gulf countries run out of interceptors against Iranian missiles and decide to \ufb01ght alongside the US and Israel, in which case the war becomes even more acute. The third is political, wherein fac- ing mounting economic dam- age, Gulf countries pressure the US to stop the war.<\/p>\n

The fourth is a wildcard. If the war triggers a major regional eco- nomic collapse, larger a\ufb00ected countries, including those with large expatriate popula- tions such as India, push the US toward a cease\ufb01re. he con\ufb02ict is currently on an escalatory ladder, with a high risk of turning into a re- gional war of attrition.<\/p>\n

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hen missiles stopped \ufb02ying between the US- Israel and Iran last June, INDIA TODAY called it an \u2018Uneasy Truce\u2019 on its cover and predicted that hostilities would return. The Twelve-Day War did not resolve the questions that sparked it. On the sur- face, these related to Iran\u2019s presumed proxi mity to developing a nuclear weapon. In less charitable readings, it was a blatant play for power and dominance over the Middle East. That guaranteed a second coming of war.<\/p>\n

It came on February 28, after tense weeks marked by massive American mili- tary movement as well as last-minute negotiations. Just as dialogue seemed on the verge of bearing fruit, peace was shat- tered by an attack on Tehran. Among those who lay assassi- nated was Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the 86-year-old Supreme Leader. Since 1989, after Khomeini, he had \ufb01lled out a unique theocratic role extending to all aspects of political authority, steering Iran\u2019s destiny in powerful, controversial ways.<\/p>\n

He was also among the most important spiritual authorities in Shia Islam globally. With his killing, a con\ufb02ict rooted in stra- tegic calculations acquired unmistakable religious overtones. Three questions immediately arise: How long will the war last? What are its objecti ves? What will it mean for India? None of them lend them- selves to easy answers. We can only attempt to map the uncert ainties and possibilities that de\ufb01ne the moment. Duration \ufb01rst.<\/p>\n

The mercurial US presi- dent Donald Trump wanted a quick \u2018in and out\u2019 strike like in Venezuela, where taking Nicolas Maduro hostage yielded a non-con- \ufb02ict that lasted 150 minutes. Early projec- tions suggested that removing the Iranian leadership might be sufficient for the whole system to crumble and that the disaffected citizens of the country would do the rest. That assumption was naive and underestimated the resil- ience of the Iranian state. Iran was strategically prepared for precisely such a moment.<\/p>\n

Atop its complex state apparatus, Khamenei had stacked high levels of redundancy: four tiers of succession for religious, military and political helmsmen. You take out one, another comes in. The expectation of a swift collapse proved totally misplaced. The West\u2019s strategic objectives were clear enough. For over two years, Trump\u2019s collaborator, Israel\u2019s prime minister Benja- min Netanyahu, acting alone or in concert, had gone for vital nodes of Iran\u2019s Axis of Resistance one by one, with varying degrees of success: Hamas \ufb01rst, then Hezbollah in Lebanon, then Syria.<\/p>\n

Their \ufb01nal goal was always to destabilise or tame Iran. They found an opportunity when the Iranian economy went into free fall under the weight of renewed sanctions and triggered nationwide protests in December-January. The state had soon quelled it with an iron hand. So, \u2018cutting the head of the snake\u2019 didn\u2019t produce popular revolt. Instead, Iran initiated a prolonged war of attrition, one with a dramatically expanded theatre.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This is a short excerpt from the opening of “” by Unknown, quoted for review and introduction purposes. All rights belong to the copyright holders.<\/em><\/p>\n

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