{"id":265561,"date":"2026-07-16T14:16:37","date_gmt":"2026-07-16T11:16:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/1kitap1.com\/en\/libya-jacob-mundy\/"},"modified":"2026-07-16T14:16:37","modified_gmt":"2026-07-16T11:16:37","slug":"libya-jacob-mundy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/1kitap1.com\/en\/libya-jacob-mundy\/","title":{"rendered":"Libya – Jacob Mundy"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"<\/figure>\n

El-Magariaf was a native of Ajdabiya, and his eventual appointment as President of the Congress was seen as a gesture to address Cyrenaican unease with the unfolding transitional process.72 Of the nineteen other parties in contention, all but one gained between one and two seats in the Congress. The one that did not was Belhadj\u2019s Watan. Sometimes mocked by Libyans as the party of Qatar, Watan was one of the first to place glitzy billboards on the streets of Tripoli in the lead-up to the vote. They not only displayed unparalleled production values but often featured an unveiled female candidate, Lamya Abu Sidra, to stress the party\u2019s moderate Islamist views.73 Libyans, however, proved wary of such obvious displays of foreign backing.<\/p>\n

Moreover, the proliferation of Islamist satellite television channels in Libya, whether supporting the Muslim Brotherhood or more orthodox Salafi viewpoints, was often viewed as evidence of meddling in Libya by Turkish or Gulf interests.74 The already conservative tendencies of Libyan society and concerns over foreign influence were said to have steered voters toward leadership that promised technocratic competence over ideology. These factors were particularly visible in terms of gender.<\/p>\n

The National Transitional Council, as noted, had set the quota for female representation in the General National Congress at a paltry 10 percent; after significant outcry, parties were mandated to alternate male and female candidates, though the 120 individual seats had no gender quota at all. Female candidates ultimately represented 45 percent of those vying for the eighty party seats, though only 3 percent of independent candidates were women and none filled any of the 120 seats allocated to individuals.<\/p>\n

The fact that Libyan women represented over 16 percent of the Congress membership was celebrated by some but raised concerns for others.75 The relative success of the National Force Alliance rested in its broad coalition, which gave it the ability to have truly national reach. It successfully ran candidates in all thirteen districts. The other parties were more regionally and locally focused, fielding candidates in only one or two districts each.76 Where moderate, conservative, and even Salafi Islamists had seemingly gained some lost ground was in the 120 seats set aside for individuals.77 Overall, the result was not just ambiguous, it was one in which no candidate, party, or interest group could claim a mandate to lead.<\/p>\n

In this context, the initial efforts to form an elected transitional government became a microcosm of the troubles Libya would face down the road. After the Council dissolved itself on August 8, 2012, the Congress set about electing its leadership.78 The first attempts to create a government were led by Mustafa Abushagur, an American-trained engineer and a long-time activist with the National Front for the Salvation of Libya.<\/p>\n

\n

The United Kingdom of Libya Gaddafi and His Global Revolution The Making of a Petro-Pariah Libya\u2019s War with Chad: A Quagmire in the Sahara International Isolation and Internal Challenges The Jamahiriyyah lie Libya on the Eve of the Revolt Notes 2: Uprising and Intervention: Libya in Revolt A Recalcitrant Regime, a Radicalized Rebellion Toward Civil War Negotiation or Intervention? Divergent International Responses to the Crisis The Intervention: A Responsibility to Protect? Turning the Tide A Question of Humanitarianism or Regime Change The Downfall of the Regime Notes 3: State of the Martyrs Early Cracks in the Consensus: The National Transitional Council and the Uprising Proliferating Centers of Power Tripoli Misrata The Nafusa: Zintan and the Imazighen Fezzan and the Sahara The East: Cyrenaica From the National Transitional Council to the General National Congress Technocracy or Islamism?<\/p>\n

The July 2012 Elections Notes 4: Hegemony or Anarchy? A Cancer on the New Polity: The Militias The Benghazi Crucible Veterans of Jihad, Old and New Dawn of the Islamists: From Bullets to Ballots Cleaning House: Accommodation or De-Gaddafization? Who Governs Whom? Taming the Militias Fingers in the Dam: Political and Economic Crises Converge The Revolution\u2019s Unfinished Business: Toward Civil War, Again Notes 5: Libya on the Brink The Tragedy of Sirte Dawn versus Dignity: The Structures of War and Peace in the New Libya Bridging the Gap: Toward a Unity Government The Mediterranean Refugee and Migration Crisis The Economics of Chaos Counterterrorism First, Peace Later: Defeating the Islamic State Internationalizing the War to Come Toward an Endgame?<\/p>\n

Notes Conclusion Taking Stock Lessons Unlearned: Rescuing Libya from Rescue Entangled Crises: Libya and the Global Notes Chronology References Index End User License Agreement OceanofPDF.com Series Title Hot Spots in Global Politics Samer N. Abboud, Syria, 2nd edition Christoph Bluth, Korea Alan Dowty, Israel\/Palestine, 4th edition Kidane Mengisteab, The Horn of Africa Amalendu Misra, Afghanistan Robert Springborg, Egypt Gareth Stansfield, Iraq, 2nd edition Jonathan Tonge, Northern Ireland Thomas Turner, Congo OceanofPDF.com OceanofPDF.com Copyright page Copyright \u00a9 Jacob Mundy 2018 The right of Jacob Mundy to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This is a short excerpt from the opening of “” by Unknown, quoted for review and introduction purposes. All rights belong to the copyright holders.<\/em><\/p>\n

\n
\n

Table of Contents<\/p>\nToggle<\/span><\/path><\/svg><\/svg><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span><\/div>\n